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Abstract:  
 
Group lending mechanism has increasingly become popular among 
microfinance providers in recent years. This is largely due to its ability to leverage joint 
liability and increase loan repayments whilst promoting entrepreneurial spirit among 
borrowers. Meanwhile, group-lending mechanism is also very important in promoting 
women empowerment through cooperative engagements of all group members. 
However, the effectiveness of the group lending methodology in the delivery of 
microfinance within a developing country context is largely under-researched. Using 
data from extensive focus groups interviews of women borrowers held in Nigeria 
among participants from 150 different groups, this paper analyses the dynamics of 
group lending mechanism (group formation, peer monitoring, pressure and support). 
The paper widens the current narrow literature on group leaders by providing a 
detailed empirical account of the activities of group leaders in a microfinance 
intervention. The findings showed that because group leaders are primarily held liable 
for loan delinquency of group members, they are highly motivated than other members 
to monitor and pressure members. The results also suggests that while group leaders 
were found to perform vital roles, some of these group leaders abused their positions 
in ways that undermine group cohesion and microfinance sustainability. Lastly, the 
paper introduces the “multiple card phenomenon” in group-based microfinance 
intervention. 
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1. Introduction: 
 
Lack of access to finance had been generally acknowledged as one of the main 
reasons why many poor people in developing countries are unable to departure 
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poverty (Vanauken, et al., 2016; Griffith-Jones & Brett, 2016; Griffith-Jones & Brett, 
2016). The inability of the poor to provide suitable collaterals, required by conventional 
banks to hedge loan risk has been considered as the main rationale for excluding the 
poor from the formal financial system. Other cited reasons for that are the high 
transaction cost of screening, monitoring and enforcing loan contracts with a group of 
people who lack a useful form of banking history, as well as making it difficult for banks 
to profit from lending to that segment of the population.  
 
However, since the successful microlending experiment of Professor 
Muhammad Yunus in Bangladeshi in the 1970’s, the poor have increasingly gained 
access to microcredit through the help of microfinance institutions. The past two 
decades have particularly experienced an exponential increased in access to finance 
for the poor in many developing countries. From 1997 to 2015, the number of 
microfinance institutions rose from 618 in 1997 to 3725 in 2015. The number of poor 
people who have received finance from these microfinance institutions rose from 13.5 
million to 211.1 million (157.6 million of them being women) during the same period 
(Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2015) 
 
Microfinance achievements in reaching millions of poor people in a developing 
country are largely owed to group lending mechanism employed by many microfinance 
institutions. Group lending has been applauded for being able to innovatively solve the 
problem of lack of collaterals and high transaction cost associated with lending to the 
poor. It does this by grouping borrowers in ways that create incentives for peer 
selection, peer monitoring and peer pressure of members to fulfil loan repayments 
obligations. Previous studies (Besley & Coate, 1995; Ghatak, 2000) have argued that 
the group lending mechanism is effective at motivating group members to carry out 
the responsibilities mentioned above by tying future loans of each member to loan 
repayments of every member of the group. Most group lending models assume that 
all members monitor each other and that monitoring efforts of members are equal (Van 
Eijkel, et al., 2011). This paper argues that by depending on all group members to 
carry out voluntary monitoring and pressure duties, exposes the fragility of the group 
lending mechanism. For instance, peer-monitoring transfers risk from the bank, which 
is in a better position to bear the risk, to the co-signer (Stiglitz, 1990). 
 
At the heart of most group-lending models are groups of borrowers who are 
often headed by group leaders. Group leaders perform the vital task of intermediating 
between the microfinance institution and the borrowers. Although the exact task of 
group leaders may differ between different groups and intervention structure, they are 
mainly responsible for chairing group meetings, updating lenders with vital information 
about the group and collecting repayments to be handed over to credit officers. 
However, despite the important and relatively expensive work of group leaders, they 
receive little or no monetary remuneration. Most apparent is the little attention that 
group leaders have received in the microfinance literature (Al-Azzam, et al., 2013). 
Pertinent questions require answers such as what are the profiles of group leaders? 
How do they emerge? What exact activities do they engage in and how are those 
affecting the group and the intervention? Why do group leaders retain their positions 
even though they are not remunerated for the costly work they perform?  
 
The contribution of this paper is three fold. First, this paper provides new 
empirical data on the dynamics of group lending methodology in a developing country 
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context. Second, it widens the gap in the microfinance literature on the activities of 
women group leaders and Third; it identifies a new phenomenon (multiple cards) which 
from the knowledge of the authors have not been addressed in the microfinance 
literature.  
 
 
2. Literature review on Group Lending:  
 
Much of the early success stories of microfinance programs had been attributed 
to self-selected borrowing group (Cason, et al., 2012). Group lending is the provision 
of loans to poor individual who belong to a small group (typically comprised of 5 to 20 
members) and meet regularly (weekly or monthly) to repay their loans (Giné, et al., 
2011). The group is form voluntarily by members selecting each other for the purpose 
of accessing uncollateralised loans. The key philosophy of group lending is the joint 
liability principle: a case where a default by a member of the group results in loss of 
access to further credit to the group except payment is made by other members to 
offset the default (Armendariz, 1999). Advocates believe that the principle of joint 
liability helps to mitigate the challenges of non-financing the poor by formal financial 
institutions due to informational asymmetries.  
 
Through joint liability, lenders can get information about borrowers by members 
of the group who have enhanced access to such information, thus reducing the risk 
for banks. Giné & Karlan (2008) argue that joint liability enhances borrower’s incentive 
to enforce repayment of loans and screen other members to ensure that only 
trustworthy individuals are allowed into the program. Because members know each 
other, safe borrowers will more likely select other safe borrowers, leaving the risky 
ones to form groups by themselves (Sengupta & Aubuchon, 2008). This reduces the 
risk associated with information asymmetry, which is often mitigated through banks 
insistence on collaterals or high-interest rates from the poor (with its attendant adverse 
selection implications). Stiglitz (1990) fond that Joint liability also reduces the problem 
of moral hazard by encouraging borrowers to monitor each other’s projects choices 
and initiate sanctions upon members who have ventured into risky projects. This is 
also supported by the work of Owusu-Manu, et al., (2018). Meanwhile, Laffont & Rey, 
(2003) points out that since the actions and inactions of borrowers affect other 
members of the group; members are stimulated to take steps to discipline anyone who 
defaults or attempts to burden the group with risk.  
 
A survey of 99 farm and non-farm groups in Malawi fond that peer selection, 
peer monitoring, peer pressure and social ties reduce the incidence of moral hazard 
(Simtowe, et al., 2006). The study argued that group-lending methodology creates 
social cohesion amongst group members that engenders cooperation and 
supervision, which reduces risky behaviours. Supporters of joint liability argue that 
because group members are likely to have adequate information about colleagues, 
the cost of peer monitoring is significantly less than lender monitoring, thus result in 
increased monitoring and repayment rate (Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990). A recent study 
(Cason, et al., 2012) fond that peer monitoring results in higher monitoring and higher 
repayment rates compared to lender monitoring in cases where the cost of peer 
monitoring was lower than the cost of the lender. In cases with no difference in 
monitoring cost, the study indicated similar loan performance between the group and 
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individual lending schemes. It can be deduce from the study that the cost of peer 
monitoring varies under different conditions and thus affect loan performance.  
 
Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch (2000) indicated that group lending reduces 
transaction cost since group meetings are held instead of individual visits of borrowers. 
Other researchers have argued that peer monitoring is costly and constrains member’s 
incentive for monitoring (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999; Aniket, 2007). According to 
Shankar (2007), the cost of peer monitoring increases the transaction cost which is 
the most important cost of lending for microfinance institutions. Shatragom and Bayer 
(2013) highlighted some of the factors that contribute to transaction cost on group 
lending. Firstly, transaction cost includes group formation cost, documentation cost, 
and cost of the appraisal; time sent on fieldwork and monitoring cost. Secondly, there 
is an additional cost of avoiding field staff expending extra effort to resolve a dispute 
among members, or solve other problems with the group. Thirdly, the cost incurred by 
members due to repayment of the loan, which can be very high especially if the group 
members are few and geographically separated. In addition, Armendáriz de Aghion & 
Morduch (2000) points out that where members leave far apart, the cost of attending 
group meetings and monitoring members may be-be high.  
 
These costs leads to an increase in the interest rates on loans and 
subsequently heighten the risk of repayment (Kodongoa & Kendi, 2013). However, 
Bhatt and Tang (2001) argued that other factors such as group member’s savings, 
liberalised interest rate and the legal systems act to reduce transaction cost for 
microfinance lenders. For instance, compulsory periodic savings reduces transaction 
cost by providing lenders with extra working capital that reduces dependency on 
donors and consequently lessen reporting and data collection by lenders. Also, the 
liberalised interest rate policy helps lenders to cover all loan cost resulting in lower 
transaction cost, and since the legal system guarantees loans, lenders feel safe 
regarding their investment and thus tend to lower interest rates or service charges.  
 
Recent studies (Shettima & Dzolkarnaini 2018; Singh & Padhi 2017; Kono, 
2014; Gine, et al., 2010) shown that freeriding problem is a major limitation to joint 
liability. The freeriding problem arises when a group member decides to take on risky 
investment with the notion that on events of default, other members would have to bail 
him out to avoid losing future loans from the micro lender. In a field experiment in 
Vietnam, Kono (2013) fond that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding 
problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. The study 
observed that when group members monitor each other’s investment returns, 
participants are more likely to choose the strategic default. Kono (2013) suggests that 
joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. In a 
related study, Fischer (2010) fond that under restricted information, joint liability 
encourages risk-taking as members’ free ride on the indemnity provided by fellow 
members. In their study of strategic default, Giné et al. (2011) confirmed the 
assumption of Besley & Coate (1995) that excerpt strong social sanctions are in place, 
joint liability may encourage default by borrowers who would have repaid under 
individual liability.  
 
Therefore, a borrower may question why he/she should be responsible for the 
default of other members of the group.  However, there is no easy answer to this 
question except that banks find this strategy a good and cost-effective mean of doing 
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business with the poor (Yeboah, 2010). A study of microfinance borrowers in 
Bangladesh and Uganda reveal that between 76% and 87% of MFIs current borrowers 
and dropouts have expressed a preference for independent borrowing (Women’s 
World Banking, 2003). The presence of freeriding problem erodes the benefit of joint 
liability since instead of creating a system of peer monitoring to reduce default, risky 
members take advantage of risk-averse members by defaulting on loan repayments.  
 
Another limitation to joint liability is that because it seeks to deter borrowers 
from using loans for non-investment purposes (Attanasio, et al., 2012), borrowers who 
need finance for consumption smoothening are more likely to be excluded. 
Contributing to this argument, Johnson & Rogaly, (1997) argued that a major concern 
of group lending approach to poverty is the danger that the very poor may be 
ostracised during the process of self-selection. Because the poorest in the society are 
often the most deprived and vulnerable and perceived as high risk, they may be 
excluded during group formation. Another drawback of joint liability is that it often insist 
on frequent, time-consuming repayment meeting and applies social pressure, which 
is burdensome for borrowers (Attanasio, et al., 2012).  
 
These perceived limitations of joint liability have heightened the debate on 
whether group lending holds any comparative advantage over individual lending 
(Kodongoa & Kendi, 2013; Attanasio, et al., 2012; Bharat & Ogden, 2010). While the 
debate is intense amongst microfinance scholars, microfinance providers across the 
world are either moving to or adding individual lending into their lending strategies.  
Attanasio et al. (2012) and Giné & Karlan, (2014) pointed out that to create lending 
products that are more attractive and less burdensome to potentially good borrowers, 
MFIs are increasingly moving from group to individual lending.  
 
 
3. Methodology and Data Collection: 
 
The main aim of the present paper is to analyse the dynamics of group lending 
mechanism and group leader’s activities using data from a microfinance NGO in 
Nigeria. The analysis is based on data gathered from 11 focus group interviews with 
group leaders and members of a microfinance NGO across five communities in 
Nigeria. The focus group interviews are supplemented by 28 face-to-face interviews 
with staff members of the microfinance NGO focusing on their relationship with group 
leaders and members within the intervention. A total of 231 respondents participated 
in the field's research. (See table 1 below). 
 
Table 1: Field Study Participation  
Individual Interviews with Staff, target communities, and number of participants 
Lagos 
state 
Edo 
State 
Kwara 
State 
Oyo 
State 
Imo 
State 
Sampling 
Technique 
Interviews 
National 
(5) 
Siluko 
(2) 
Share 
(2) 
Ibadan 
1 (2) 
Emekuku 
(2) 
 
 
Purposive 
Sampling 
 
Loan 
officers / 
Managers/ 
directors 
Isolo (3) New 
Benin 
(3) 
Oja 
Ipata (2) 
Gwagi 3 
(2) 
Owerri 1 
(3) 
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Badagry 
(2) 
- - - - 
Focus Group Interviews with women borrowers, target communities, and the 
number of participants 
Badagry 1 
(12) 
 
Siluko 
(13) 
Oja 
Ipata 
(35) 
Iworoad 
(17) 
Emekuku 
(15) 
 
Homogenous
, Snowball, 
and 
Purposive 
Sampling 
Women 
Borrowers 
in groups 
Badagry2 
(11) 
- - - - 
Isolo (19) New 
Benin 
(12) 
Share 
(23) 
Gwagi 
(24) 
Owerri 1 
(22) 
Total respondents for individual Interview 28 
Total respondents for groups interviews 203 
Total Respondents for qualitative sample 231 
 
 
Table 1 shows the communities selected for this study, the number of 
respondents that participated and the sampling technique used. Snowball sampling 
technique was used to identify potential respondents for the focus group interviews. 
Some staff at the national and branch levels of the NGO were interviewed and then 
asked to identify active group leaders and members from different credit unions who 
could participate in the research. At this stage, purposive sampling was used to select 
respondents based on factors such as the length of time spent with the microfinance 
intervention, actively using microfinance as of the time of the study, accessibility, and 
willingness to take part in the research. After that, the active leaders and members 
were randomly selected from different unions and merged to participate in the focus 
group interview.  
 
Randomly selecting borrowers from different credit unions (groups) to form the 
focus group interviews was to ensure the diverse perspectives and experience of 
women borrowers from the different credit unions were adequately represented.  
 
 
4. Results and Discussion: 
 
4.1 Group Formation Process in a Group Lending Microfinance NGO: 
 
Generally, the process of Group formation is often the first step in the 
implementation of the group-lending model. In this regard, a women focussed 
microfinance NGO enters a community through mobilisation: a process whereby 
staffs, often branch managers or Credit Officers raises awareness of its products and 
services to prospective women clients. Before every mobilisation exercise, a survey 
of the area is conducted to ascertain its commercial viability and to assess the 
quantum of women-owned enterprises in the area. Upon meeting the above two 
criteria, the NGO sends facilitators to the area to hold one to one discussions with 
each women entrepreneur in their business premises. This is done as a way of 
encouraging the spread of entrepreneurship spirit among these women, which can 
lead to great economical benefits to the local, regional and national economy 
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(Alsharief and El-Gohary, 2016; Aninze, et al., 2018; Dosumu, et al., 2017; Millman 
and El-Gohary, 2011; and El-Gohary, et al., 2016). 
 
Explaining the process, a staff opined,  
 
“We conduct mobilisation, by going to their (poor Women 
entrepreneurs) shops and telling them about our products and services 
and how we can help them”.  
 
Olomola (2002) found that similar method was employed by FADU to attract 
new members into its union in Nigeria. By targeting commercially viable areas and 
women in business ensures that the very poor and idle women are technically 
excluded from the intervention. However, the smallness of the initial loan (N60,000), 
the idea of joint liability and compulsory meetings attendance in public places with 
poor women prevents wealthy entrepreneurs from joining the intervention. The idea 
received confirmation in a study in Ghana where Yeboah (2010) found that similar 
methods were employed by microfinance institutions to exclude the non-poor from the 
intervention.  
 
Women who indicated interest during or after the mobilisation process followed 
advice form groups for loan disbursement. It is at this point that women are 
encouraged to self-select members of their chosen group. When asked about how 
members are selected, Women borrowers stated that any of their friends, relatives or 
fellow business colleague who was interested in having a loan and meet the loan 
criteria were introduced to the group leader. Who then take her to meet the branch 
manager at the branch office. It is worth noting that besides the lending criteria 
established by the microfinance NGO, group members do have their own criteria. They 
include:  
(i) Prospective member must reside or trade in the same area  
(ii) The occupation of each member must be known to all or at least the 
referee member  
(iii) Prospective member must be seen to be of good character, responsible 
and hardworking.  
 
By insisting on these additional levels of screening requirements, the women 
borrowers claim that it lessens the chance of selecting high-risk individuals who may 
increase the repayment burden of the group or place the group in disrepute. Giné et 
al., (2013) and Ghatak & Guinnane, (1999) have highlighted how self-selection helps 
to reduce the problem of adverse selection in lending to the poor. For instance, 
Ghatak’s (2000) model shows that safe borrower would rather pay higher to join the 
group of safe borrowers to avoid paying joint liability payments frequently.  
 
Asked why group lending was the preferred choice for the microfinance NGO, 
staffs highlighted the following: that groups act as collateral, reduces the problem of 
information asymmetry, transaction cost (transportation cost, monitoring and 
management cost of dealing with groups as compared to individuals) and improves 
repayment due to peer pressure from a member. Other cited reasons were the belief 
that poor women could be better empowered when they network with each other, 
share ideas and knowledge, benefit from group solidarity and support each other at 
times of crisis. 
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4.2 Peer Monitoring and Pressure: 
 
After the group formation process, microcredit is disbursed individually to each 
member but based on joint liability. The theory of joint liability consists of two main 
aspect that facilitates loan repayment: peer monitoring and peer pressure. Peer 
monitoring refers to actions taken by members to observe their peers in the aim of 
ensuring repayment. Aniket (2007) and Sinn (2013) agrees that peer monitoring 
reduces the problem of moral hazard and improves loan repayment. Effective peer 
monitoring assumes that members have adequate knowledge of where and how peers 
invest the microcredit, and this constrains individuals from using the loan they receive 
for purposes that may endanger repayment (Hermes, et al., 2005). In line with theory, 
interviewed staff of the NGO stated that it was expected that group members would 
monitor each other inspired by joint liability.  
 
Asked whether they knew where and how peers used loans, most of the women 
borrowers interviewed revealed that they were unconcerned where and how their 
peers in invest loans as much as repayments were made on time. Only a few women 
claimed they knew how women specifically invited into the group by them use loans. 
The women claimed they did not know how women not invited by them use the 
microcredit.  In addition, when asked whether they were aware that women borrowers 
could have used loans for other purposes, surprisingly, the staff at NGO stated that 
they were aware that woman borrowers use their loans for other purposes. As claimed 
here:  
 
“most of our women are straightforward, some of them use it to 
build houses, and we don’t bother in as much as their business is still 
growing”.  
 
The staff, however, claimed that clients are strictly advised not to divert funds 
meant for their business, and on occasions, credit officers conduct monitoring 
exercises on borrower’s shop. It is obvious that peer monitoring was of little importance 
given that women borrowers were known to use loans for non-business purposes. It 
could also be argued that the staff monitoring was ineffective since infringements were 
ongoing without deterrents.  
 
However, it was gathered from the field that if indeed any borrower were 
motivated to monitor members of the group, it would be the group leader or secretary. 
The reason for this is that they both are often made to repay the loans of defaulting 
members when group members are either unable or refuse to cover the repayment. 
When asked how default was dealt with in the group the following response was made:  
 
“If members default in paying their loan, everything will be on 
leader and secretary and the CO’s (credit officers) will request the money 
from us because we sign off for every new member”.  
 
“As a leader, if a member does not turn up to meetings with her 
money it is the leader that will bear the brunt, the leader often repays the 
loan and later find ways to recover the money from the defaulter”. 
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A staff who mentioned that corroborated the above statements:  
 
“We, first of all, call the leader and ask her to provide money for 
the defaulter and if she is a good leader she rallies around and gets the 
money”.  
 
Further probing revealed that loan repayments by group leaders were kept 
secret by the staff of the NGO to reduce the possibility of a contagion effect. A group 
leader claim that  
 
“We keep this practice as a secret between us, the CO (credit office) 
and BM (branch manager) so as not to encourage members to default”.  
 
Investigating repayments incentives under group lending, Besley & Coate 
(1995) suggested that the default of some group members could have a contagion 
effect where the entire group defaults when at least some members would have repaid 
had they not been saddled with the weight of liability for their partners' loans. 
 
Interviewed staff mentioned that at certain times, group leaders or Secretary 
does provide them with information about the financial health of group member and 
advice on whether it was proper to disburse loan to the borrowers or not. Staff 
explained that  
 
“The feedback they give us is sometimes what we use in making a 
loan decision. For instance, a leader might advise me to give a new member 
an amount of loan that is less than what she asked for because the leader 
knows that, that is her capacity”.  
 
It is quite easy to appreciate why group leaders would take peer monitoring 
seriously especially given that they stand to withstand the worst of non-repayment by 
a member.  
 
In a study of two Eritrean, microfinance institutions, Hermes, et al., (2005) found 
that peer monitoring by group leaders may help reduce moral hazard behaviour of a 
group member, however, peer monitoring by group members was not found to have 
any positive impact on moral hazard behaviour. In contrast to earlier studies (Ghatak 
& Guinnane, 1999; Armendariz de Aghion, 1999; Stiglitz, 1990) which advocated the 
idea that peer monitoring could encourage repayments; this paper finds no relationship 
between peer mentoring and repayments. Given that group, members were 
unconcerned about how their peers use loans and more so, because there is open 
knowledge that members use loans for non-business purpose. The paper adds to the 
findings of Hermes, et al., (2005), that group leaders are motivated to monitor 
members to avoid having to bear repayment burden of a defaulting member.  
 
It has been widely argued that peer pressure plays a significant role in 
microfinance repayments (Schurmann & Johnston, 2009; Armendáriz & Morduch, 
2010). Peer pressure refers to a form of policing of fellow group members with the risk 
of imposing sanctions if they fail to conform to agreed standards. Recent studies have 
argued that the threat of potential sanctions is employed in-group lending schemes to 
promote repayments rates and reduce credit delinquency (Hermes & Lensink, 2007; 
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Giné & Karlan, 2014). Group sanctions take different forms: group criticism of 
defaulters, financial sanctions, exclusion from the group and stigmatisation from both 
group and wider community members.  
 
When asked whether sanctions were used to pressure members to repay loans, 
most of the interviewed women claim that each group had specific rules that address 
the unruly behaviour of members. Although the figures vary between groups, most 
interviewees claimed that fines ranging between N100 to N500 were specified to be 
paid by group members who either arrive late or fail to attend the meeting for 
repayment. Other more stringent measures were also in place. A group leader states 
that  
 
“For members who are around but fails to pay, they will pay double 
if I repay their debt”.  
 
These measures are believed to exert pressure on members and ensure that 
they repay their loans.  
 
In contrast, a few groups were reported to have no sanctions in place, yet 
claimed they had never experienced loan delinquency. Further probing revealed that 
in such groups, members were either driven by the fear of non-reimbursement of loans 
at the end of the loan circle or the guilt of letting down the leader, credit officer or NGO 
despite having benefited from the intervention. It was apparent that some women 
borrowers were motivated by the guilt of letting down social relations gained through 
microfinance than sanctions. In a recent study, Griffin & Husted (2015) found that 
harmonious social relations played a significant role in improving repayment rates 
compared to sanctions.  
 
Therefore, in summary, the findings reveal that sanctions could be as effective 
as harmonious social relations in encouraging repayments could. The result further 
strengthens the argument that the poor are a heterogeneous group (Sridhar & Reddy, 
2014; Peterson, 2015), thus, are likely to respond differently under similar conditions. 
The present paper argues that by allowing the dynamics of sanctions and social 
relations to thrive within the same intervention may have allowed the NGO to cater to 
the heterogeneous nature of poor women. 
 
4.3 Peer Support: 
 
Peer support refers to ways in which members of the group assist each other 
in loan repayment and other areas such as welfare and solidarity. The study found 
that women borrowers did support each other financially. This is what a group member 
said when asked if they benefited from the group: 
 
“It is very good because we help ourselves, support each other and where 
there are any lapses (late or non-repayment) we try to cover it (make up 
for the repayment) amongst ourselves”. 
 
It was not uncommon for members to lend to other members struggling to meet 
their repayment obligations. The researcher found that there were many informal 
arrangements employed by group members to support loan repayment. One of such 
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arrangements was the group savings between members of the group often used to 
offset repayments shortfalls. As mentioned above, group leaders and secretaries 
usually step in to top up or in some cases make full repayments for members who are 
shortly unable to repay. The researcher found that group executives (leaders and 
secretaries) were literate and financially better off than other members thus were in a 
better position to offer support to members in loan repayments. Although, group 
executives are increasingly becoming wary of having to carry the burden of non-
repayment. 
 
Peer support within group members was not limited to issues of loan 
repayments. The study found that social relationships amongst group members further 
entrenched their financial relationships. Most of the interviewed women claimed that 
when a misfortune such as theft accosts a member, they members will contribute 
towards repaying her loan until she regains financial stability. It was also common for 
group members to attend the funeral and other celebrations and could even make a 
financial contribution to support a member. Recounting their experience, group 
members made the following comments:   
  
“In my group when a member is hosting an event, we go together 
as to group to show solidarity and support for that member. Also, if any 
member loses her family member, we usually make monetary 
contributions to support that person”. 
 
“In our group, if a member delivers a baby, we contribute money 
and donate to her to show our support for her”. 
 
Group members have also suggested that peer support has been vital in their 
business. The study found that members were willing to mentor new members in 
business and provided advice to members on how to diversify or move from a poorly 
doing business to a more profitable business. Some interviewed women mentioned 
the invaluable assistance from members concerning helping their business survive 
and thrive. Some members recalled that:  
 
“There was a woman who joined our group; she introduced me to a 
new business which was more profitable than the one I was doing since 
then I have been doing that new business, and I am prospering in it”.  
 
“When I joined the group, I was buying my stock at Benin, but a 
fellow member advised me to start buying from Onitsha since it was 
cheaper there, I started doing that, and my profit started rising, and my 
business expanded”.  
 
The members believe that deepened social relations in the forms mentioned 
above engenders group solidarity and further strengthens women’s support networks.  
 
The NGO supports the social interactions of women and believes it promotes 
their empowerment. In this regard, the NGO helped the groups to set up a union purse 
where members could contribute to and withdraw from to cater for repayments of the 
member, welfare and celebrations events. The NGO claims that the purpose of the 
union purse was to promote group cohesion and provide an extra layer of support to 
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group members. While some of the interviewed women claimed the union purse was 
primarily used to support members with loan repayments, others claim they have 
drawn on the union purse to organise the end of year parties and other celebrations 
aimed at deepening the social relations within the group. Although, interviewed 
members claimed it was difficult to access the union purse and that few groups have 
benefited from the purse. The difficulty with accessing the union purse was due to the 
staff of the intervention unwillingness to grant access to the women borrowers.  
 
In summary, the interview and observation showed that women borrowers well 
accepted the joint liability concept of group lending employed by the Grooming Centre. 
It has been argued that group-lending methodology generates social capital for 
members and improve group cohesion if members engaged in collective activities 
beyond microfinance (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Feigenberg, et al., 2014). The 
study found that the Grooming centre could promote the activities of the women 
beyond the confines of microfinance. The researcher noted from observations during 
group meeting that some women borrowers showed some degree of cordiality and 
closeness amongst themselves. Some members claimed these relationships were a 
product of their participation in the microfinance intervention. In this regard, a group 
member state that:  
 
“Through this group I have come to know and make new friends, 
we cooperate, assist each other and learn from each other”. 
 
4.4 Group Independence, Decision Making and Relationship with Staff: 
 
Group independence and groups ability to make decisions without undue 
interference from microfinance staff is vital to the empowerment of the women 
borrowers. Recent studies (Lavoori & Paramanik, 2014; Holvoet, 2005) suggest that 
women’s membership of group-oriented association helps to shift overall decision-
making patterns from norm-guided and male-led to more joint and female-led decision 
making. The study assessed the group’s ability to make independent decisions and 
their relationship with field staff of the microfinance NGO. 
 
Women borrowers enjoyed a high degree of autonomy regarding the running 
of activities in their groups. Asked how decisions concerning the management of the 
group were taken, women borrowers claimed that decisions are made on the 
consensus of every member of the group and without interference from the staff. For 
instance, decisions on the choice of meeting day, venue and time were made within 
and between group members. Also, group members alone make decisions on group 
sanctions, fees and general rules guiding the activities of members.  
 
An interviewee claims that “in our group, everyone contributes to decision 
making, for instance, there is a penalty (N50) for late coming, and everybody agrees 
with that”. The women borrowers explained that it was not their practice for staff 
members to unilaterally meddle into the affairs of the group. Interviewees claim that 
for example, staff would have to consult the group before admitting any new member 
to the group. Asked whether the staff of the microfinance could expel any member of 
the group without adequate consultation, the women borrowers unanimously said it 
was not possible.  
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Although the groups largely operated autonomously, there were instances 
where field staff of the microfinance NGO would intervene. It was common for field 
staff to interfere in the group especially when there were indications that the group 
could be at risk of default. Staff members could unilaterally reduce the loan size of a 
borrower if there were signs of a possible default. Field staff could also expel chronic 
defaulters howbeit the group was always briefed. The interference of field staff was 
intended to reduce or prevent losses to the microfinance NGO.  
 
When asked about their relationship with the field staff of the intervention, 
women users replied in the positive. Interviewees claim they had an excellent working 
relationship with credit officers and other staff of the intervention. A unanimous 
response from the women echoed, “they (credit officers) are excellent, 100%”. Most 
especially, they claim that field staff show a lot of respect for the poor women borrower. 
They were quite delighted at how field staff showed empathy, care and patience in 
dealing with them. Interviewed borrowers expressed the following:  
 
“CO (credit officers) always pray for us that’s why we are 
successful in business”.  
 
“Grooming has the best COs compared with other MFIs. They 
have a good manner of approach; they don’t use insulting words on us”. 
 
 
5. The Role of Group Leaders and the Burden of Group Leadership: 
 
Group leaders play a prominent role in the functioning of group-based 
microfinance interventions (Hermes, et al., 2006; Al-Azzam, et al., 2013). They are the 
main contact point between the group and the microfinance institutions or NGO’s. Van 
Eijkel et al., (2011) observe that being the intermediary between the microfinance 
provided and poor borrowers, the group leader must make a regular report to the 
program’s staff on the performance and sustainability of the group. By carrying out 
such duties, the group leader is placed in a position of authority and how she exerts 
this authority has implications on the group cohesion and the empowerment of group 
members. Despite, the acknowledged role of group leaders, they have attracted very 
little attention in the microfinance literature (Al-Azzam, et al., 2013). By examining the 
role of group leaders in a microfinance intervention, this study narrows the gap in the 
microfinance literature.  
 
Upon investigating the profile of group leaders, the study found that group 
leaders were more literate and financially well better off than other members of the 
group were. The educational background of group leaders may not be unconnected 
to their willingness to put themselves forward to lead the group. In a study on whether 
education matters in leadership, Besley et al., (2011) found that not only is education 
critical to the emergence of leaders but that growth is enhanced by having leaders 
who are highly educated. Observations at group meeting reveal that group leaders 
were articulate in expressing their views and those of the group. It could be argued 
that the lucid disposition of group leaders could be useful in effectively communicating 
the needs and concerns of the group to the microfinance NGO. 
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The emergence of group leaders was self-determined or often endorsed by the 
microfinance NGO. It was gathered from the field that most of the group leaders were 
the actual initiators of the group, thus, by default they became group leaders. On other 
less frequent circumstances where members were attracted through staff mobilisation, 
the staff of the NGO usually identifies the most vocal amongst the women and would 
approach such individuals to form and lead the group. Perhaps the intention of the 
microfinance NGO was to aid the emergence of individuals with the capacity to handle 
the complexities of managing poor women. During the group formation process, the 
group leader was responsible for inviting new members and vetting their character and 
repayment potential. It is the practice of the NGO to ensure that the leader to receive 
her loan must accompany every member of the group.  
 
The reason for this was to ensure that the leader identifies the borrowers and 
pledges their support for her loan disbursement. This meant that group leaders would 
first know the financial and character profile of members to enable her to vouch for the 
member. The study found that often than not, it is during this process that the staff can 
get more information about the members and instil the notion of joint liability in the 
minds of the group leader. Staff states, “In her (member) application form the leader 
and the person who introduced her will sign which creates a link”.   
 
Without this link, there is no pressure on her to repay the loan, and we may not 
be able to get useful information about the borrower”. The study believes that by 
vouching for members, group leaders involuntarily accepts the responsibility of 
ensuring the member's repayments. The researcher found that the group leader is 
often held responsible for vouching for members who end up defaulting on their loans. 
Recounting her experience, a group leader claims that “if members default in paying 
their loan, everything will be on leader and secretary and they COs (Credit Offices) will 
request the money from us because we sign off for every new member. 
 
Group leaders are solely responsible for the smooth running of the group. With 
little support from the group secretary, group leaders are involved in organising weekly 
meetings, which include identifying a suitable venue, setting up and moderating the 
meetings. Given that the weekly meetings are also used to collect loan repayments, 
group leaders would make efforts at ensuring that all members were in attendance. 
Attendance of members was necessary to ensure that the group was up to date with 
their repayments. A group leader explained how she would always call up her 
members at her expense to remind them of weekly meetings. It was an expectation 
from the NGO that leaders should lead by example and that meant that group leaders 
would arrive at meetings venue an hour or two before members and would often be 
the last to leave the venue. A group leader recalls that “in our group, our meeting holds 
at 9 am, as a leader I get there at 7 am and start arranging everything before 9 am all 
my member will be at the venue”. Some interviewed group leaders claimed that they 
lose a whole day’s business, as they would have to shut their shops to organise the 
group meeting. By so doing, the researcher estimates that on average group leaders 
lose 48 days of business to shop closure within a 12 months period.   
  
It was clear that the burden of group leadership was taking its toll on some of 
the leaders, as they were disquiet about the weight of their role. What was more 
troubling was the burden of repayments of loans taken by group members. In contrast 
to the literature that suggests that under joint liability, all group members helped repay 
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delinquent loans, we found that group leaders were rather more involved in 
repayments than members were and even when members contribute, group leaders 
pay the highest amount. Recounting her painful experience in repayment a group 
leader recalls that “as a leader, I have been paying for a defaulter since she 
absconded, but when it became unbearable, I went with my CO (credit officer) to meet 
up with the guarantor, who helped us to recover the money”.  
 
Another group leader mentioned that “one of our members took a loan of 
N70,000 and on her first week she ran away with the money, as a leader I am the one 
paying the money, our members only contributed N8,900”. The disproportionate loan 
size was cited as the main reason for members’ reluctance to be jointly liable for a 
large loan taken by a member when they had only taken a small loan. Yeboah (2010) 
confirms the finding of this study. By making multiple repayments for group members, 
group leaders pay a far costly price for leading poor women borrowers. The noticeable 
financial implication is that by making such unintended repayments, group leaders lose 
finances that could have been invested in their business or family welfare. To this end, 
some of the leaders feel worse off while others expressed exhaustion due to the 
burden of group leadership.  
 
Why are group leaders uninterested about relinquishing their positions despite 
the enormous burden of leading the group? Due to the group lending mechanism and 
joint liability element employed by the microfinance NGO, there is no doubt that the 
disillusion of the group could lead to the closure of access to finance from the 
intervention. Group leaders consider their role of ensuring group cohesion pivotal to 
group members’ sustained access to microfinance. Most group leaders believe in the 
noble idea that is effectively carrying out their duties (regardless of its cost 
implications) ensures that the livelihoods of their fellow members were promoted. The 
feeling of being responsible for the livelihoods of poor women drives their commitment 
to continue leading the group.  
 
More so, given that they are more educated and financially well to do than other 
members, group leaders feel it is incumbent upon them to leverage on their profile for 
the betterment of their poor fellow women. The study found that some group leaders 
appreciate the idea of “serving the greater good” and this ensured that they kept their 
positions regardless of the immense burden it brings. In this regard, a staff member 
stated that “some leaders repay the loans for defaulters because they don’t want 
anything that will tarnish the image of their group and they keep it secret from us. In 
this case it is a burden on the leaders”.  
 
Perhaps certain exclusive benefits available to group leaders may be that they 
are unconnected to their reluctance to relinquish their position. Being the intermediary 
between the group and the microfinance NGO, group leaders are prioritised in the 
microfinance intervention. Besides having extra powers to adjudicate on group issues, 
group leaders received exclusive leadership training that expands their business 
acumen and people management skills. An exclusive gathering of leaders and staff 
called “The general assembly” also allows group leaders to jointly take critical 
decisions with the management of the NGO on issues ranging from product 
development, meeting client demands and resolving group issues. Originating from a 
poor and neglected background, these activities create empowerment opportunities 
that most of the group leader’s may not have experienced before.  
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Thus, they may be unwilling to give it up. Group leaders are in a better position 
to build lasting relationships with staffs of the NGO that could be leverage on in future 
endeavours. Van Eijkel et al., (2011) argues that group leaders attach more weight to 
future benefits than present gains. Additional perks such as bags, aprons and other 
gift items are given to groups leaders for participating in general assembly meetings. 
It was also gathered from the field that group leaders were accorded respect by both 
group members and the wider community, and this is often uncommon given the 
cultural context (male dominance) in most of the visited communities. The study found 
that group leaders recognised they held privileged positions. Thus, they were willing 
to sacrifice anything to retain their positions.  
 
On realising the power associated with group leadership, some leaders have 
sought to exploit their positions for their selfish interest. The study found that some 
leaders abuse their positions to the detriment of members and the intervention. A 
prominent charge by group members is that group leaders extort money from them to 
accompany them to loan disbursement. Being the practice of the NGO that members 
must be accompanied by their leaders on loan disbursement, group leaders exploit 
this avenue to charge members fees ranging between N500 – N2000 per member. 
Group leaders argue that they collect such fees to cater for the transportation cost 
incurred when accompanying a member to the office and the cost of having to leave 
their shops unattended. Some group leaders echoed this in the following statements 
“as a leader; we charge them #1000 per person. We collect the money as 
transportation fee and because we are leaving our shops unattended for the duration 
of time spent at the office”.  
 
However, it was gathered that the fees charged were far greater than the actual 
cost of transportation to the office of the NGO. Although some groups claim, the fees 
were consensually agreed by all members of their group, most interviewees were 
dissatisfied with the charges. What was even more surprising was that despite group 
members’ vocal expression of concern to such arbitrary charges, the NGO felt helpless 
in addressing the issue. Asked if they were aware of arbitrary charges imposed by 
group leaders, a staff member explained:  
 
“Some leaders collect N1000 from members’ especially new 
members or members receiving disbursement, I have received complaints 
about this, but I don’t interfere in the running of the groups”.  
 
It is clear from the staff statement below that it took member’s threat of leaving 
the intervention, for the microfinance NGO to act. This implies that for those poor 
women who are unable or due to their immense reliance on microfinance are unwilling 
to make such threats; the NGO may not intervene. The fact that no group leader has 
been punished for imposing fees on members indicates that the NGO is not doing 
enough to curtail such arbitrary use of position. The same staff recalls that  
 
“I had to intervene in a case where the member wanted to leave 
the organisation because her leader insisted on collected N1000 from her 
at disbursement; I appeal to the Leader to forfeit the N1000”. 
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Group leaders have also been found to use wild/multiple cards. A senior staff 
explained the multiple cards phenomenon as follows:  
 
“We have observed that some leaders use multiple cards or jumping 
of cards, which means they use fictitious people to collect loans. They 
(leaders) introduce fake people, collect loans, and after some time they tell 
us the persons have absconded”.  
 
Perhaps the rationale behind the use of multiple cards stems from the desire to 
always remain (or to be perceived) as financially better off than other members. The 
study observes that group Leaders did not only want to be perceived as been efficient 
in managing the group but also as a microfinance success story. They believed that 
their ability to command respect from group members was dependent on their success 
in the intervention.  
 
The problem with multiple cards is that when undetected, group members may 
be compelled to repay such loans or face the possibility of the group's disbandment. 
In some instances, the microfinance NGO does write off debts to enable the group to 
remain active. Essentially, the use of multiple cards by group leaders increases the 
debt profile of both the group and the microfinance NGO that may have grave 
implications for the long-term sustainability of the intervention. The practice of multiple 
borrowing (same individual borrowing from multiple MFIs) have received some 
attention in the literature (Debnath & Roy, 2016; Faruqee, et al., 2011; Venkata & 
Yamini, 2010). However, the multiple cards phenomenon has not been addressed in 
the microfinance literature.  
 
During the focus group interviews with women borrowers, the researcher 
observed that some group leaders would attempt to drown the voices of members by 
raising their voices and in some instances, insist on responding to the interview 
questions alone. Realising that such behaviours may be aimed at suppressing the 
voices of fellow members, the researcher probe staff members to establish their 
awareness of such issues. When asked if they were aware that group, leaders use 
their position to drown the opinions of members, staff members claim that:  
 
“Yes, I have had a member report her leader for being 
excessively powerful”. 
“From my experience, I found that in certain cases the leaders 
want to suppress the views of these women”.  
 
“Yeah, some members have complained that leader doesn’t 
allow them to have a voice, she overshadows us”.  
 
By not allowing members to freely contribute or have their voices drown suggest 
that group leaders contribute to the feeling of helplessness and powerlessness 
amongst poor women (Narayan & Patel, 2000). It is clear from those above, that group 
leader do exercise and flex their authority. However, some leaders adopt a more 
dictatorial leadership style such that members feel that their voices were muted.  
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6. Conclusion: 
 
This study provides an empirical analysis of the dynamics of group lending 
mechanism and documents the activities of group leaders in women focus on 
microfinance intervention. The results of the qualitative research show that group 
leaders are more motivated to monitor and pressure members to comply with loan 
repayments because they are often held responsible for loan delinquency within the 
group. The study found that the disproportionateness of loan size contributed to group 
member’s reluctance to be jointly liable for a large loan taken by a member when they 
had only taken a small loan. Consequently, group members shy away from 
contributing to cover loan delinquency and even when they do, group leaders still pay 
the larger share. 
 
Typically, the group lending methodology generates social capital for members 
and improve group cohesion as members participate in collective activities beyond the 
microfinance intervention. Group members learn, share and mentor each other and 
most of all show solidarity in periods of crisis and celebration. Emergent results 
suggest that group leaders play a vital role in-group lending schemes; they are more 
educated and financially well off than group members. However, the study found that 
some leaders abuse their position by engaging in multiple cards phenomenon, 
extortion of money from members and suppressing of members views. Generally, the 
activities of group leaders were found to be critical to the sustainability of the group 
and the microfinance NGO. Given that the multiple cards phenomenon has not 
received attention in the microfinance literature, the study, therefore, suggests the 
need for further studies to explore the effect of the multiple cards phenomenon on 
group cohesion and the sustainability of group lending schemes.  
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